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Abstract – This paper proposes a practical algorithm 
for solving very large-scale SCOPF problems, based on the 
combination of a contingency filtering scheme, used to 
identify the binding contingencies at the optimum, and a 
network compression method, used to reduce the complex-
ity of the post-contingency models included in the SCOPF 
formulation. By combining these two complementary 
simplifications, it is possible to solve SCOPF problems 
addressing both preventive and corrective controls on 
continental sized power system models and with a very 
large number of contingencies. The proposed algorithms 
are implemented with state-of-the-art solvers and applied 
on a model of the European transmission system, of about 
15000 buses, and with about 11000 contingencies.  
Keywords: Security-constrained optimal power flow, 
contingency filtering, network compression, network 
equivalents, nonlinear programming 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and related work 
 
The security-constrained optimal power flow 
(SCOPF) problem is in its general form a nonlinear, 
non-convex, static, large-scale optimization problem 
with both continuous and discrete variables [1]. The 
efficient solution of SCOPF problems is indispensable 
for system operators, in the context of planning, opera-
tional planning and real-time operation. SCOPF prob-
lems have been formulated in various settings, in partic-
ular in the “preventive only” mode [1] and in the “cor-
rective also” mode [2], the difference between these 
modes being that the former does not consider the pos-
sibility of re-scheduling controls in post-contingency 
states, except for automatic responses to contingencies 
(e.g., generators participation in frequency control, 
automatic tap-changers, etc). 
One of the main challenges of SCOPF problems is 
their huge dimensionality, especially when they are 
formulated for very large-scale systems and/or when a 
very large number of contingencies have to be consi-
dered. The direct solution of these problems, for very 
large-scale power systems, would indeed imply the 
simultaneous representation of a very large number of 
network constraints multiplied by a very large number 
of post-contingency cases, and hence would lead to 
extreme memory requirements and totally prohibitive 
computing times.  
However, in real-life applications a very large pro-
portion of the candidate contingencies are generally not 
constraining the SCOPF problem, and for most of the 
contingencies, most of the network constraints are inac-
tive. This sparse nature of the problem suggests that 
SCOPF calculations could be applied effectively to very 
large-scale power systems, if they could benefit from 
contingency selection and network reduction methods.   
In the SCOPF literature, three main classes of ap-
proaches have already been proposed in order to miti-
gate the drawbacks of the direct approach: (i) iterative 
contingency selection schemes [1,3,4,5,6,7], (ii) decom-
position methods [2,12], and (iii) network compression 
(NC) [8].  
The first class of approaches generally rely on the 
following ingredients: (i) a SCOPF solver which is 
applied to small subsets of potentially active contingen-
cies, (ii) a (steady-state) security analysis engine (SA) 
used to globally check N-1 security, (iii) a contingency 
filtering (CF) technique, and (iv) an OPF formulation 
(and solver) used to check whether post-contingency 
states may be secured via corrective control [1,3,6,7,8]. 
Furthermore, SCOPF computations could also be sim-
plified by adding to the base case constraints only a 
small subset of relevant post-contingency inequality 
constraints (e.g. by using linear approximations around 
a base case) and by neglecting in the first place all post-
contingency equality constraints [1,4,5]. 
The second class of approaches iterate between a cer-
tain number of slave sub-problems (post-contingency 
cases) and the master problem (pre-contingency case). 
The sub-problems receive the optimal values of pre-
contingency control variables at the current iteration 
from the master problem; in turn they send a linear 
constraint to the master problem. The latter accumulates 
these linear constraints beside the base case constraints. 
The iteration proceeds until an optimality criterion is 
satisfied. The convergence of the decomposition algo-
rithms can only be guaranteed under convexity assump-
tions which may hold only for the linearized model but 
can not be proven for the AC model [2]. As a conse-
quence, for the latter, the decomposition methods may 
fail or produce a sequence that does not converge to a 
(local) optimum. The use of the decomposition strate-
gies (Benders, Dantzig-Wolfe, Talukdar-Giras, etc.) for 
large scale optimization problems have been investi-
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 The third class of approaches proposes a network 
compression of post-contingency states which allows 
reducing the size and the CPU times of the post-
contingency constraints. This technique exploits the 
property that the impact of a contingency is generally 
limited to a localized area of the network. 
Each of these approaches required to solve a SCOPF 
modeled as an optimization problem. The following 
state-of-the-art methods are often used: sequential linear 
programming based methods [1,4,5], Newton methods 
[2,3], and interior-point methods [6,7,8].  
Although several commercial SCOPF packages are 
available from various vendors, and are routinely used 
by many system operators, the scientific literature re-
porting on experiments using SCOPF solvers on very 
large-scale systems is still quite limited. Indeed most 
publications reporting on SCOPF algorithms provide 
only results obtained on small to medium sized power 
systems, rarely exceeding 1000 buses. Furthermore, 
those publications that report results on larger power 
system models typically rely on questionable models 
(e.g. the DC power flow approximation [5]) or on sim-
plified solution techniques (e.g. successive linear pro-
gramming [1,4,5]), which strongly limit their practical 
impact (e.g. to the optimization of active power flows 
only under mildly loaded conditions).  
1.2 Paper contribution and organization 
 
In this paper we propose a unified approach and algo-
rithms for solving the SCOPF problem for very large-
scale systems. This approach combines an iterative 
contingency filtering (CF) algorithm, as proposed in 
[6,7], with a network compression (NC) method, as 
proposed in [8].  Our algorithm thereby acts simulta-
neously along two complementary directions to reduce 
the overall complexity of the SCOPF problem. Indeed, 
on the one hand, the CF technique is used to quickly 
identify the binding contingencies at the optimum (and 
hence limit the number of contingencies included in the 
SCOPF computations carried out at successive itera-
tions), and, on the other hand, the NC method is used in 
order to reduce the size of each post-contingency model 
included in the SCOPF computations, by identifying the 
potentially affected areas for each contingency and by 
representing only these latter as SCOPF constraints.  In 
the rest of this paper we will use the acronym ISCOPF-
NC, in order to denote our approach (iterative security-
constrained optimal power flow with network compres-
sion) 
Importantly, and in contrast to most approaches ap-
plied to very large-scale SCOPF problems, the imple-
mentation of our ISCOPF-NC uses a non-linear AC 
network model in both pre-contingency and post-
contingency states. It exploits also recent developments 
in the context of nonlinear programming solvers [10]. 
To cope with corrective control actions, we have ex-
tended the original NC approach, which was designed 
for “preventive only” SCOPF problems [8]. 
We use a quite challenging optimization problem to 
demonstrate the approach, namely a “corrective also” 
SCOPF problem for the whole European Transmission 
System (ETN) (containing about 15000 buses) with 
respect to about 11000 contingencies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 provides the general formulation of the SCOPF prob-
lem, Section 3 details the proposed algorithms, Section 
4 reports numerical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2 GENERAL SCOPF FORMULATION 
The general formulation of the SCOPF problem that 
we address in this paper can be compactly formulated in 

















































                
where C is the set of postulated contingencies, sub-
script k  refers to variables and constraints of the 
thk  
post-contingency state, subscript “0” refers to variables 
and constraints of the base case (pre-contingency state), 
x and u  denote the vectors of state and control va-
riables, ),( uxf  is the objective function, ),( uxg and 
),( uxh  denote the vectors of equality and inequality 
constraints, ku is the vector of changes in control 
variables due to the automatic control of the system 
following the thk  contingency, rest is the allowed 







duk is the vector of maximum poss-
ible rates of change of control variables. 
Notice that in this paper we will not focus on the op-
timal treatment of discrete variables, and hence we will 
model them as continuous variables. The formulation 
(1) corresponds thus to a so-called Non-Linear Pro-
gramming (NLP) problem. 
3 ITERATIVE SCOPF WITH NETWORK 
COMPRESSION (ISCOPF-NC)  
3.1 Global scheme of the proposed approach 
 
The flowchart represented at Figure 1 gives a global 
overview of the proposed algorithm.  
 
 3.2 Overview of the computational modules used by the 
ISCOPF-NC approach 
 
The ISCOPF-NC uses the following modules: 
a) A Load flow (LF) computation module is used to 
obtain a reasonable starting point of the ISCOPF-
NC algorithm. 
b) A SCOPF module is used to solve the main 
SCOPF problem (§2), which includes only the con-
tingencies selected by the filter and further com-
pressed by the NC method. Note that at the first ite-
ration, the set of potentially binding contingencies 
is empty and the SCOPF is consequently an OPF 
computation concerning only the pre-contingency 
conditions. 
c) A Security Analysis (SA) module checks whether, 
at the optimal solution provided by the SCOPF 
module, there are some among the candidate con-
tingencies that would lead to violations of some 
post-contingency constraints (branch flows or vol-
tage limits). The so identified contingencies are 
called critical contingencies. If the set of critical 
contingencies is empty an acceptable solution of the 
SCOPF problem is found and computations termi-
nate. 
Notice that because we use the network compres-
sion method within the SCOPF (see section 3.5), it 
may be possible that when running the SA module 
at the optimal solution provided by the SCOPF, 
some of the potentially binding contingencies (those 
already included in SCOPF) still lead to small con-
straint violations. If these violations are above a 
given tolerance, the compression factor used in the 
NC module (see section 3.5) will be reduced for the 
concerned contingencies for the subsequent itera-
tions. Relevant equipments may be missed by the 
network compression method, for instance equip-
ments not impacted by the incident but close to 
their limits. To overcome this drawback, those 
equipments can be included directly in the active 
region. 
d) A Contingency Filter (CF) module selects among 
the critical contingencies those that are candidates 
to be added to the current SCOPF problem. These 
contingencies are called selected contingencies. 
Further details about the CF techniques are pro-
vided in section 3.4. 
e) A Post-Contingency OPF (PCOPF) module which, 
in the “corrective also” approach, keeps among the 
selected contingencies only those unable to reach a 
feasible point within the restoration time.  
For this purpose, each selected contingency is as-
sessed using the PCOPF module to evaluate the 
overall amount of restoration time needed to reach 
a feasible point.  
For each contingency k , the PCOPF problem can 









































Where *0u  is the vector of base case optimal values 
of control variables (stemming from the optimal so-
lution of the SCOPF problem at the current iteration) 
LF 
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Figure 1: ISCOPF-NC Flowchart 
 and kz is the vector of positive slack variables aimed 
to relax coupling constraints. The other variables 
have the same meaning as in formulation (1). 
If the value of the PCOPF objective is nonzero, an 
extra amount of restoration time is needed. The con-
tingency is then called uncontrollable and is added 
to the SCOPF problem. Otherwise, the contingency 
is called controllable and is not added to the SCOPF 
problem. 
The uncontrollable contingencies that must be added 
to the SCOPF problem are called potentially binding 
contingencies. If the set of potentially binding con-
tingencies is empty an acceptable solution of the 
SCOPF problem is found and computations termi-
nate.  
Note that the PCOPF is not needed in the “preven-
tive only” approach where all selected contingen-
cies are obviously considered as potentially binding.  
 
f) For each potentially binding contingency, a Net-
work Compression (NC) module is used in order to 
reduce as much as possible the size of the post-
contingency power system model that has to be 
added to the current SCOPF problem. Further de-
tails about the NC method are provided in section 
3.5. 
 
3.3 Description of the approach algorithm 
 
The main steps of the ISCOPF-NC algorithm are 
summarized as follows (see also Figure 1): 
 
1. Obtain an initial base case by performing a load 
flow calculation (LF module).  
2. Solve the SCOPF problem by adding new potential-
ly binding contingencies to those already identified 
at the previous iterations. 
3. Identify critical contingencies among the full set of 
postulated contingencies, by using the SA module 
at the optimal solution of the current SCOPF prob-
lem. If the set of critical contingencies is empty 
computations terminate. 
4. Select among the critical contingencies a subset of 
potentially binding ones by using the CF module.  
5. In the “corrective also” approach, identify the un-
controllable contingencies among the selected ones, 
by means of the PCOPF module. 
6. Define the set of additional potentially binding 
contingencies: in “preventive-only” case, those se-
lected by the CF; in “corrective also” case, the sub-
set of contingencies selected by the CF identified as 
uncontrollable by the PCOPF.  
7. Reduce the model of each new potentially binding 
contingency by using the NC module. Note that un-
satisfactory compressed models of potentially bind-
ing contingencies added in previous iterations will 
be reviewed, eventually with tightened tolerances 
(cf. §3.2). 
8. As long as the subset of new potentially binding 
contingencies is not empty, these contingencies are 
added in the compressed form to the current 
SCOPF problem and the iterative process starts 
again from step 2.  
3.4 Contingency filtering techniques 
 
The Contingency Filter selects a subset of the critical 
contingencies using one of the following two approach-
es: the non-dominated contingency (NDC) approach 
[6,7], or the security index (SI) approach [1,3,4,6,7]. 
Both approaches exploit the amount of constraints vi-
olation at the converged load flow solution obtained 
from the SA module after assessing all given contingen-
cies at a given iteration.  
The proposed algorithm focuses on the NDC ap-
proach. A contingency k  is dominated by contingency 
j  if contingency j  leads to a larger or equal violation 
for every constraint than contingency k , and a strictly 
larger violation for at least one constraint. Hence, a 
contingency is non-dominated if no other contingency 
dominates it. The principle of the NDC contingency 
filtering approach is to select the non-dominated contin-
gencies among the given set of contingencies. 
 
3.5 Network compression method 
3.5.1 Contingency compression concept 
 
The compression method [8] identifies, for each 
postulated contingency, a limited area called the active 
region where the contingency has a significant impact. 
The variables and elements of the active region are kept 
in their real identity. The nodes and elements that do not 
belong to the active region are replaced by a REI-DIMO 
equivalent network [9]. 
The active region is composed of two sub regions: 
the direct and the indirect regions (Figure 2).  
The direct active region is defined as the set of buses 
and branches where the contingency has a significant 
impact in terms of voltages and power flows deviations 
with respect to base case values. 
The indirect active region concept is motivated by 
the fact that there are control variables located outside 
the direct active region that may significantly impact 
(during the optimization process) the constraints con-
cerning the elements selected in the direct active region. 
The criteria and relations concerning the setting up of 
the direct and indirect active region are described in 
details in [8]. However, the possible impact of the cor-
rective actions should be taken into account while de-
termining the active region. The extension of the NC 
approach to the corrective SCOPF is accomplished in 
the following way: 
 The indirect active region will be enlarged with all 
the nodes and branches having their voltages and 
power flows significantly impacted by the varia-
tions of the controls selected initially in this region. 
This choice aims to avoid that varying indirect area 
 controls to remove violated constraints would in 
turn violate constraints outside the direct active 
area.  
 When generators active powers are used as con-
trols, it is mandatory to include in addition in the 
indirect active region the connection nodes of these 
generators as well as the branches having the flows 
significantly impacted by the variations of these ac-
tive powers in the corresponding post-contingency 
states. These branches are selected in the following 
manner: 
 The impact on power flows at both sides of 
each branch is estimated by means of the sensi-
tivity matrix relating the variations of the ac-
tive and reactive branch power flows (
QP TT  , ) to the active and reactive power 






























































where  )(kJ  is the Jacobian matrix.  
The superscript (k) indicate that the elements of 
the matrices are evaluated for the post-
contingency state k (both topology and voltage 
values). They should therefore be updated with 
the estimation of the post-contingency voltage 
values. 


















,,, . Only the ap-
parent power flow sensitivities at both sides of 
each branch with respect to the active power 




























 The branch ik located outside the direct active 
region is added to the indirect active region if 
its scaled apparent power flow sensitivities 
with regard to all pair combinations ሺ ௚ܲ,௝, ௚ܲ,௟ሻ 
of active power generations selected as con-




























where T  is the threshold value and the subscript N 




     Figure 2: Network compression method concept 
 
3.5.2 Network reduction 
 
The direct and indirect active regions compose the 
active region of a contingency and must therefore be 
kept in their real identity. The nodes that do not belong 
to the active region are reduced using the REI-DIMO 
equivalencing method [8,9].  
The generating units (respectively loads) that do not 
belong to the active region are grouped in one or several 
REI-DIMO generator (respectively REI-DIMO load) 
equivalent nodes. The generators (respectively loads) 
are grouped according to their coherency evaluated on 
the basis of the phase of their injected current.  
The generators and loads connected at the REI-
generator and REI-load equivalent nodes keep their real 
identity. Consequently the control variables attached to 
these generators and loads (namely their active and 
reactive powers) continue to exist as such in the optimi-
zation problem although they belong to the equivalent 
network.  
4 NUMERICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Description of the test system 
 
In this section we apply the proposed approach on a 
very large system stemming from the whole European 
transmission system, model built in the context of 
PEGASE project [13,14]. 
This system contains around 15000 buses and 4500 
generators. We postulate a set of 11265 contingencies 
which consists in the N-1 loss of any line, transformer, 
generator or capacitor bank connected to the 380kV 
voltage level of the network. The initial solution satis-
 fies the production limits (both active and reactive pow-
ers).  
 
4.2 Description of the SCOPF problem 
 
With respect to the SCOPF formulation (1), the ob-
jective of the problem is to minimize the shift of active 
power production needed to preventively ensure the N-1 
security of the system. The control variables are the 
generators active and reactive powers. The constraints 
are the AC power flow equations, branches flow limits 
and physical bounds on generators active and reactive 
powers. 
As each considered state brings approximately 45000 
variables, the resolution of a SCOPF containing the 
whole 11265 contingencies in full AC representation is 
obviously prohibitive in terms of memory resources and 
computation time (≈ 500 million variables). 
Our simulations highlight the filtering and compression 
ratios obtained respectively by the CF and NC modules 
and the expected size of the reduced SCOPF. Some 
comparisons of computation time obtained on optimiza-
tions solved by the SCOPF module are also given. 
All tests have been performed on a PC 2.4-GHz Intel 
Core Duo P8600 with 1.9-Gb RAM. 
4.3 Security Assessment and Contingency Filter 
 
For the purpose of this example, the Security As-
sessment monitors only the current on each branch of 
the system and the Contingency Filter uses the non-
dominancy criterion. 
Since we started from a situation where some trans-
mission system elements are already overloaded in the 
base case, all the 11265 postulated contingencies have 
naturally been identified as critical by the Security As-
sessment.  
Nevertheless, the Contingency Filter finally selects 
only 275 non-dominated contingencies, hence only 
2.5% of the set of postulated contingencies. 
Despite the very good global problem complexity re-
duction at this stage (i.e. 97.5% with respect to the di-
rect SCOPF approach), the problem is still too large for 
the available computational resources (≈ 15 million 
variables). 
 
4.4 Network Compression 
 
For the purpose of this example, the Network Com-
pression uses the most restrictive tolerances found in 
[8], namely: 
 1.5 degree for ߝఏ,ௗ௜௥ and ߝఏ,௜௡ௗ 
 1.5% for ߝ௏,ௗ௜௥ and ߝ௏,௜௡ௗ 
 3% for ߝ்,ௗ௜௥ 
 5% for ߝ்,௜௡ௗ 
Where ߝఏ,ௗ௜௥, ߝ௏,ௗ௜௥, ߝ்,ௗ௜௥ (respectivelyߝఏ,௜௡ௗ,ߝ௏,௜௡ௗ, 
 ߝ்,௜௡ௗ) are tolerances on voltage angle, voltage magni-
tude and apparent flow on branches for determining the 
Direct Active Region (respectively the Indirect Active 
Region). 
The compression factor for a single contingency is 
defined as the number of eliminated busses by the NC 
module divided by the total number of busses in the 
original system divided by, expressed in percent. 
On the set of 275 selected contingencies, the NC 
module obtains a rough compression factor of 98% 
leading to an average number of 300 busses for charac-
terizing the model of each kept contingency. 
For most selected contingencies (i.e. 247 cases), less 
than 2% of the original network is kept, which repre-
sents an excellent compression ratio given the tight 
tolerances used. On the other hand, we have also identi-
fied 7 contingencies for which more than 30% of the 
original network is kept, and up to almost the whole 
network for three of them.  
A deeper analysis of these contingencies shows that 
they effectively provoke strong perturbations of the 
system.  
The remaining 21 contingencies lead to a compres-
sion factor between 90% and 98%. 
The global compression factor of 98% leads to a 
SCOPF problem with around 300000 variables which 
can in principle be handled by the SCOPF module. 
However, the tight memory limitations imposed in our 
simulations (less than 2GB of RAM) prevents us to 
include all the 275 contingencies in compact representa-
tion and more than 2 contingencies in full representa-
tion. Consequently, the SCOPF calculation is in the next 
stage limited to the first 260 contingencies in the de-
creasing order of compression factor. 
 
4.5 SCOPF solution 
 
Three similar SCOPF problems are built from the ini-
tial test case.  
Problem A contains the set of compressed contingen-
cies after the application of CF and NC. As mention in 
the previous section only the first 260 contingencies in 
terms of compression factor have been considered. 
Problem B includes the compressed model of two 
among the 260 contingencies of problem A.  
Problem C includes the full AC model of the same 
two contingencies as problem B.  
The three SCOPF problems are compared in terms of 
number of variables, number of constraints and compu-
tation time. 
The SCOPF problems are solved using IPSO, an In-
tegrated Power Systems Optimiser developed by Trac-
tebel Engineering [11]. 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of each SCOPF 
problem: 
 
SCOPF #contingencies #variables #constraints 
A 260 94872 81628 
B 2 41796 30778 
C 2 115370 91344 
Table 1: Problems characteristics 
  
Table 2 shows the computation time to solve the core 
optimisation of each SCOPF problem: 
 




Table 2: Computation time 
The accuracy of both methods used in the present al-




The feasibility of the approach has been proven un-
der very stringent computational limitations (memory 
and CPU resources). Dedicated architectures certainly 
allow to handle larger SCOPF problems and to improve 
computation time. 
However, in the context of day-ahead operational 
planning, the proposed algorithm is already useful and 
the results very encouraging for comfortable computa-
tions of SCOPF on very large scale systems. 
For more stringent conditions (N-x or real-time), the 
proposed algorithm may be adapted to provide a mean 
to reduce risk. For instance, by selecting the largest 
number of the most critical contingencies (e.g. sorted by 
decreasing order of compression factor) such that the 
problem is still compatible with real-time requirements, 
the ISCOPF-NC can provide indications to improve the 
security of the system. Moreover, as in real-time the 
operating state is not likely to differ drastically from one 
time-window to the other, the ISCOPF-NC could use 
the information of the previous solution (e.g. the solu-
tion itself, the list of binding contingencies) to start 
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